The Role and Importance of the Chinese Government for Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investments by Fetscherin, Marc & Gugler, Philippe
Rollins College
Rollins Scholarship Online
Faculty Publications
1-1-2010
The Role and Importance of the Chinese
Government for Chinese Outward Foreign Direct
Investments
Marc Fetscherin
Rollins College, mfetscherin@rollins.edu
Philippe Gugler
University of Fribourg
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.rollins.edu/as_facpub
Part of the International Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Rollins Scholarship Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of Rollins Scholarship Online. For more information, please contact rwalton@rollins.edu.
Published In
Fetscherin, Marc and Gugler, Philippe, "The Role and Importance of the Chinese Government for Chinese Outward Foreign Direct
Investments" (2010). Faculty Publications. 82.
http://scholarship.rollins.edu/as_facpub/82
12 AIB Insights  Vol. 10,  No. 4
chinese ouTward foreign direcT invesTmenTs  show a 
strong positive trend over recent years and have attracted considerable 
attention from academia and the business press. Many observers and 
commentators express interest in the role the Chinese government 
plays in the activities and decision-making of Chinese multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in connection with their foreign direct investments 
(FDI). 
This article makes a contribution by investigating the relationship be-
tween the Chinese government and MNEs in connection with their 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). We present a 2x2 matrix 
where one dimension includes the interest (high/low) of the Chinese 
government  and the other the interest of MNEs (high/low). We argue 
that, in market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking, both interests are 
aligned and high, while for efficency-seeking motives Chinese com-
pany interests are high but government interests are relatively low.  In 
regard to resource-seeking motives and balancing foreign currency re-
serves, Chinese government interests are high but company interests 
relatively low. Our matrix allows us to understand the role and interests 
of the Chinese government in the decision-making process as well as 
the relationships with Chinese companies in outward foreign direct in-
vestments. 
Trends and Patterns in Chinese FDI
China’s OFDIs have shown a strong positive trend over recent years. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, outflows were only marginal, at about 
US$ 800 million (UNCTAD WIR, 2009). But since 2003, Chinese OFDI 
has demonstrated impressive growth, increasing from US$ 2.8 billion 
in 2003 to US$ 52.2 billion in 2008 (UNCTAD WIR, 2009: 53). However, 
while Chinese OFDI is clearly accelerating, it is still small by any relative 
measure. In 2006, Chinese OFDI accounted for only 1.5 percent of the 
world’s total FDI. In 2008, China’s share of world FDI reached 2.8 percent 
(UNCTAD WIR, 2009). 
Most Chinese OFDIs are in neighbouring Asian countries, especially 
those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (MOF-
COM, 2008: 67-68). China’s Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong, 
attracts by far the highest amount of OFDI. In 2008 it was the preferred 
destination of 63 percent of Chinese OFDI (MOFCOM, 2008: 67). A sig-
nificant amount probably constitutes round-tripping investments or 
investments to offshore financial centres or to re-investments back to 
China due to favorable tax situations in Hong Kong and other countries. 
Therefore, Hong Kong and other offshore financial centers are transit 
points for Chinese ODFI that need to be factored into the reported sta-
tistics and analyses.
Looking at Chinese FDI in terms of stock flows, leasing and business ser-
vices are the most popular sectors, accounting for US$ 54.5 billion, fol-
lowed by the financial sector (US$ 36.7 billion), wholesale and retailing 
(US$ 29.8 billion) and mining with US$ 22.8 billion in 2006 (MOFCOM, 
2008: 80). The importance of the financial sector may be illustrated by 
the fact that, according to MOFCOM (Chinese Ministry of Commerce), 
Chinese state-owned commercial banks had established 47 branch of-
fices, 31 affiliated institutions and 12 representative offices in 19 coun-
tries in 2006, including the United States, Japan and Great Britain (MOF-
COM, 2006: 51). Our data for this article are based mostly on official data 
provided by MOFCOM, but some authors cite a lack of disclosure and 
transparency in data sources about Chinese foreign direct investments 
(see article from Derek Scissors in this issue). 
The best way to understand the strategies of Chinese MNEs is to link 
their preferred investment destinations with their main investment 
sectors since a close relationship exists between the sectoral and geo-
graphical distribution of Chinese OFDI.  Figure 1 illustrates that Chinese 
OFDI in the Middle East and Africa targets mainly extractive industries. 
According to UNCTAD (2008), the Chinese government supports the 
development of Chinese firms’ activities in Africa, especially in sec-
tors such as energy and resource exploitation. OFDI in manufacturing 
is prevalent in Eastern Europe (especially transport equipment), Latin 
America (mostly heavy industry) and Asia (electronics). Sales, market-
ing and support activities are generally performed in Western European 
countries and in North America. International mergers and acquisitions 
are the primary mode of entry of Chinese firms in developed econo-
mies. However, Chinese firms have not yet invested heavily in manufac-
turing and sectors with high added value. As far as production activities, 
transport is the key sector in Western Europe, while ICT plays an impor-
tant role in North America.
Figure 1 suggests that Chinese MNEs follow a regionalization strategy 
rather than a global one (Rugman & Doh, 2008: 134 ff.). The 12 larg-
est Chinese firms have the highest average percentage of intraregional 
sales and assets. This observation is not specific to Chinese MNEs but 
refers to most MNEs as Rugman (2008) found out (see also Sukpanich & 
Rugman, 2009). This contrasts with the inference of the press that Chi-
nese OFDI is a global strategy led, or at least influenced, by the govern-
ment.
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Government Primacy over Foreign Direct Investments
A number of points need to be raised to outline the relationships be-
tween the Chinese government and the private sector for Chinese 
OFDI. For many years, typical private sector business was non-existent 
in China. With the economic liberalization and the introduction of pri-
vate ownership in the 1980s, private sector activities took root. They 
were partially built on individual entrepreneurial initiatives and state 
policies such as the one on privatization (Gugler & Boie, 2009). Some 
companies are identified as future “national champions”, and most have 
a close relationship with the government (Morck et al., 2007). Since the 
“going global” strategy adopted by the government at the end of the 
1990s, both Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and private en-
terprises are engaged in FDI. But most of the large-scale investment 
projects that weigh heavily in FDI statistics have so far been executed 
by Chinese SOEs. The shares of FDI flows coming from SOEs under the 
Central Government in recent years were 73.5 percent (2003), 82.3 per-
cent (2004), and 83.2 percent (2005). The remaining shares of FDI flows 
are split among investments of SOEs administered by regional govern-
ments, non-SOEs owned collectively, and privately-owned companies. 
The success of SOEs abroad is quite limited due to their lack of competi-
tiveness and know-how and because the acquisitions usually reflect a 
political agenda rather than business needs.  
Neither the trends nor motives for Chinese OFDI can be understood 
without reference to government policies and the role of the Chinese 
government. This is especially true in the case of China. China’s OFDI 
is still highly regulated, even though policies have shifted from pro-
hibition to gradual opening and finally to active promotion, at least 
for some SOEs in strategic sectors or industries (Gugler & Boie, 2009: 
29-30). Morck et al. (2007) assessed the connections between govern-
ment and business in China, confirming the government’s central role 
in OFDI.  FDI by any Chinese 
firm requires approval by the 
Chinese authorities, including 
MOFCOM, the State Admin-
istration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE), and the National De-
velopment and Reform Com-
mission (NDRC). Through this 
approval process, the Chinese 
government ensures that all 
investment activities, even if 
executed by privately owned 
companies, conform to gov-
ernment policies and goals. 
Clearly, this needs to be taken 
into consideration when ana-
lyzing the motivations and 
strategies of Chinese MNEs 
investing international. The 
following Figure 2 illustrates a 
conceptual framework outlining the interests of the government ver-
sus the interests of Chinese companies. This 2x2 matrix maps the four 
motives of OFDI (market seekers, efficiency seekers, resource seekers 
and strategic asset seekers [Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 67 ff ]) as well as 
the huge trade surplus and the management of extensive currency re-
serves Chinese companies, state-owned or private, hold. 
Source: Own illustration. Based also on Gugler and Boie, 2008.
Model Implications
 (1) Our framework suggests that an area of increasing OFDI might exist 
where government and company interests are high, such as market-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking.
Figure 1: Share of Chinese OFDI in the World
Source: Own illustration based on MOFCOM, Statistical Bulletin on Chinese OFDI, 2008.
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As noted by UNCTAD, “market-seeking FDI is by far the most common type 
of strategy for developing-country TNCs in their process of internationaliza-
tion” (UNCTAD WIR, 2006: 158). Several recent studies point to the rise 
of market-seeking motives driving Chinese MNEs toward large markets 
(Zhang, 2003). The FIAS/MIGA global survey confirms the prevalence 
of Chinese market-seeking FDI. In their study of Chinese FDI from 1984 
to 2001, Buckley et al. (2007) show that market-seeking was a key mo-
tive for Chinese FDI. However, during this period, Chinese firms moved 
away from market-seeking strategies in nearby foreign markets toward 
securing raw materials in riskier markets (Buckley et al., 2007). Chinese 
companies that have invested abroad for market-seeking purposes 
include Haier, TCL, and Huawei Technologies. They have all made re-
peated efforts to enter the more affluent developed economies such 
as the US. 
While the UNCTAD global survey indicates that strategic asset-seeking 
FDI is a relatively modest motive for developing-country MNEs (14% 
compared to 51% for market-seeking FDI), the situation is quite differ-
ent for Chinese MNEs (UNCTAD WIR, 2006: 162). Among Chinese MNEs, 
51 percent regard strategic asset-seeking as an important motive for 
their FDI, compared to 85 percent for market-seeking, 39 percent for 
efficiency-seeking and 40 percent for resource-seeking FDI (UNCTAD 
WIR, 2006: 168). Strategic asset-seeking often seeks to acquire informa-
tion and knowledge on how to operate internationally. However, as the 
experience of Chinese firms in this area grows, their goal has turned to-
ward  intangible assets, such as advanced proprietary technology and 
intangible strategic assets such as brand names (Buckley et al., 2007: 
505). Chinese firms increasingly use mergers and acquisitions to acquire 
strategic assets with a view to building their competitive advantage. 
The acquisition of foreign technologies and brands is often regarded as 
a shortcut to establish a company as an international player. Prominent 
examples include Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) 
acquiring MG Rover, Lenovo acquiring IBM’s PC division, or the recent 
acquisition in 2010 of Volvo by Zhejiang Geely Holding Group. However, 
the success of these investments remains to be seen. 
(2) Another situation occurs where government interests are high and 
company interests low. One might also argue that because the govern-
ment interests are so high, there are almost no private companies in 
that industry and only SOE which are under the government control. 
Most resource-seeking investments fall into this category, as do invest-
ments balancing foreign currency reserves. The Chinese government 
clearly has an interest in a strong economy and therefore supports 
MNEs’ international investments. China’s powerful economic develop-
ment machine requires a steady supply of natural resources, including 
ferrous and non-ferrous materials, precious metals, minerals, oil and gas. 
But the country is comparatively poor in most natural resources except 
coal. Chinese companies have therefore been very active in resource-
seeking. FDI in natural resources is mainly driven by availability rather 
than proximity. The destinations for Chinese OFDI include resource-rich 
countries in Africa and Central Asia, together with Australia, Russia and 
Canada (Buckley et al., 2007: 511). According to UNCTAD (UNCTAD WIR, 
2009), the Chinese government and Chinese MNEs generally regard 
natural resources as an important reason to invest abroad. Because se-
curing resources for their growing home economy is a strategic priority, 
a large proportion of Chinese MNEs engaged in these efforts are state-
owned. The top three Chinese outward investors are all companies in 
the natural resources field. In 2002 alone, CNPC acquired two oilfields 
in Azerbaijan and, together with Petrochina, the companies Devon 
Energy Corp. (Indonesia) and Salyan Oil (Azerbaijan). CNOOC acquired 
Repsol-YPF SA (Indonesia). Chinese companies also acquired fishery, 
timber and agricultural products. For example, Huaguang Forest Co.Ltd. 
acquired the Rayonier Inc. timberland operation (New Zealand). 
(3) Finally, there exist investments where government interests are low, 
but company interests high. Most efficiency-seeking investment falls into 
this category. For Chinese companies, however, efficiency-seeking FDI 
is relatively unimportant because of low costs in their home economy 
(UNCTAD WIR, 2006: 160). This result confirms studies indicating that, 
given the low production costs in China, efficiency-seeking does not 
play a major role for Chinese MNEs going global (Buckley et al., 2007: 
501). But efficiency-motivated Chinese FDIs may increase in the future 
(UNCTAD WIR, 2006: 160).
Government involvement has negative implications along with the 
positive. Corporations need the freedom to base strategic decisions on 
market requirements rather than fulfilling institutional instructions and 
goals. Foreign partners may take a critical view of strong government 
intervention. Child and Rodriguez (2005) state that successful interna-
tional Chinese firms are non-SOEs or companies that have made ar-
rangements to protect themselves from bureaucratic interference. 
There are also many deals that fail and deserve further investigation. 
From 2005 through 2009, China saw at least 40 business deals, each 
worth US$ 100 million or more, fall through. Prominent failed deals in-
clude Chinalco, which bid US$ 19.5 billion for a larger stake in Rio Tinto 
in 2009; CNOOC attempted in 2005 to buy UNOCAL for US$ 18 billion 
but was sidetracked by US politicians. In 2008 the China Development 
Bank’s bid for Germany’s Dresdner Bank was killed by Chinese regula-
tors.
Concluding Remarks
This article briefly presents and discusses the role of the Chinese gov-
ernment in MNE foreign direct investments. We present a 2x2 matrix 
where one dimension shows the interests (high/low) of the Chinese 
government and the other dimension the interest of Chinese MNEs 
(high/low) for their outward foreign direct investments. 
For example, where the interest of the Chinese government and Chi-
nese companies are high and aligned, we expect the scale and the 
speed in which those investments will be conducted and executed to 
be large and fast. Lenovo, for example, acquired IBM’s PC division while 
Volvo was acquired by Zhejiang Geely Holding Group. 
The matrix allows us to classify and distinguish between different FDI 
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motives and it describes the government role. This helps foreign gov-
ernments as well as senior executives of non-Chinese companies not 
only to assess the relationship between them and the Chinese com-
pany but the relationship between them and the Chinese government, 
whether local, regional or national. 
But, given the way the Chinese government is using OFDI to strategical-
ly support the development of the Chinese economy and companies, it 
remains to be seen whether this is convincing and the kind and level of 
foreign government resistance. 
Already today, China’s pervasive government involvement in its pri-
vate sector causes foreign policymakers to worry about the impact 
of non-commercial bidders, national security and economic security. 
Chinese data on OFDI lack full disclosure and transparency, according 
to some researchers. We therefore encourage IB researchers to further 
investigate the relationship among the Chinese government, Chinese 
companies and their individual and cumulative effect on the success of 
Chinese FDI.  Additional questions for study include: What are the short- 
and long-term implications for the competitiveness of Chinese MNEs? 
Is such a tight government involvement in Chinese MNEs sustainable in 
the long run? What is the role of Chinese SMEs for OFDI? What is the re-
lationship among the different levels of Chinese government and how 
does it impact Chinese MNE OFDI? These are just a few questions we 
propose for further investigation. 
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